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Abstract 40 
This paper presents the overview of the Shared Socioeconomic Pathways (SSPs) and their energy, land 41 
use, and emissions implications. The SSPs are part of a new scenario framework, established by the 42 
climate change research community in order to facilitate the integrated analysis of future climate 43 
impacts, vulnerabilities, adaptation, and mitigation. The pathways were developed over the last years as 44 
a joint community effort and describe plausible major global developments that together would lead in 45 
the future to different challenges for mitigation and adaptation to climate change. The SSPs are based 46 
on five narratives describing alternative socio-economic developments, including sustainable 47 
development, regional rivalry, inequality, fossil-fueled development, and a middle-of-the-road 48 
development. The long-term demographic and economic projections of the SSPs depict a wide 49 
uncertainty range consistent with the scenario literature. A multi-model approach was used for the 50 
elaboration of the energy, land-use and the emissions trajectories of SSP-based scenarios.  The baseline 51 
scenarios lead to global energy consumption of 500-1100 EJ in 2100, and feature vastly different land-52 
use dynamics, ranging from a possible reduction in cropland area up to a massive expansion by more 53 
than 700 million hectares by 2100. The associated annual CO2 emissions of the baseline scenarios range 54 
from about 25 GtCO2 to more than 120 GtCO2 per year by 2100.  With respect to mitigation, we find that 55 
associated costs strongly depend on three factors: 1) the policy assumptions, 2) the socio-economic 56 
narrative, and 3) the stringency of the target. The carbon price for reaching the target of 2.6 W/m2 57 
differs in our analysis thus by about a factor of three across the SSP scenarios. Moreover, many models 58 
could not reach this target from the SSPs with high mitigation challenges. While the SSPs were designed 59 
to represent different mitigation and adaptation challenges, the resulting narratives and quantifications 60 
span a wide range of different futures broadly representative of the current literature. This allows their 61 
subsequent use and development in new assessments and research projects.  Critical next steps for the 62 
community scenario process will, among others, involve regional and sectorial extensions, further 63 
elaboration of the adaptation and impacts dimension, as well as employing the SSP scenarios with the 64 
new generation of earth system models as part of the 6th climate model intercomparison project 65 
(CMIP6).  66 
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1. Introduction 67 
Scenarios form an essential part of climate change research and assessment. They help us to understand 68 
long-term consequences of near-term decisions, and enable researchers to explore different possible 69 
futures in the context of fundamental future uncertainties. Perhaps most importantly, scenarios have 70 
been crucial in the past for achieving integration across different research communities, e.g., by 71 
providing a common basis for the exploration of mitigation policies, impacts, adaptation options and 72 
changes to the physical Earth system. Prominent examples of such scenarios include earlier scenarios by 73 
the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (SA90, IS92, and SRES) and the more recent 74 
Representative Concentration Pathways (RCPs) (Moss et al., 2010; van Vuuren et al., 2011). Clearly, such 75 
‘community’ scenarios need to cover many aspects: they need to describe different climate futures, but 76 
ideally also cover different possible and internally consistent socioeconomic developments. Research 77 
has shown that the latter may be just as important for climate impacts and adaptation possibilities as for 78 
mitigation options (Field et al., 2014; Morita et al., 2000).  79 
Moss et al. (2010) described the “parallel process” of developing new scenarios by the climate research 80 
community. This process includes the Representative Concentration Pathways (RCPs), which cover the 81 
climate forcing dimension of different possible futures (van Vuuren et al., 2011), and served as the basis 82 
for the development of new climate change projections assessed in the IPCC Fifth Assessment Report 83 
(IPCC, 2013; Taylor et al., 2012). Based on two main initial proposals by Kriegler et al. (2012) and van 84 
Vuuren et al. (2012), the design of the socioeconomic dimension of the scenario framework was also 85 
established (Ebi et al., 2014; Kriegler et al., 2014a; O'Neill et al., 2014; van Vuuren et al., 2014). The new 86 
framework combines so-called Shared Socioeconomic Pathways (SSPs) and the RCPs (and other climate 87 
scenarios) in a Scenario Matrix Architecture. 88 
This article is the overview paper of a Special Issue on the SSPs where we describe critical subsequent 89 
steps to make the framework operational. Elaborate descriptions of the different SSP elements are 90 
summarized in fourteen other articles in this special issue complementing this overview paper. To this 91 
end, we present new SSP narratives (O'Neill et al., 2016a) and associated quantitative descriptions for 92 
key scenario drivers, such as population (KC and Lutz, 2016), economic growth (Crespo Cuaresma, 2016; 93 
Dellink et al., 2016; Leimbach et al., 2016), and urbanization (Jiang and O'Neill, 2016). These projections 94 
and their underlying narratives comprise the basic elements of the SSPs and have been further used for 95 
the development of integrated scenarios, which elaborate the SSPs in terms of energy system and land-96 
use changes (Bauer et al., submitted; Popp et al., submitted) as well as resulting air pollutant (Rao et al., 97 
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submitted) and greenhouse gas emissions and atmospheric concentrations. A detailed discussion of 98 
integrated scenarios for the individual SSPs (Calvin et al., submitted; Fricko et al., submitted; Fujimori et 99 
al., submitted; Kriegler et al., submitted; van Vuuren et al., submitted) complement the special issue.   100 
The SSPs and the associated scenarios presented here are the result of an iterative community process, 101 
leading to a number of important updates during the last three years. Considerable attention was paid 102 
during the design phase to ensure consistency between the different elements. By providing an 103 
integrated description - both in terms of the qualitative narratives as well as the quantitative projections 104 
- this paper aims at providing a broad overview of the main SSP results.  105 
The process of developing the SSPs and IAM scenarios involved several key steps. First, the narratives 106 
were designed and subsequently translated into a common set of “input tables”, guiding the 107 
quantitative interpretation of the key SSP elements and scenario assumptions (e.g., on resources 108 
availability, technology developments and drivers of demand such as lifestyle changes – see O’Neill et al. 109 
(2016a) and Appendix A of the Supplementary Material). Second, the narratives were translated into 110 
quantitative projections for main socioeconomic drivers, i.e. population, economic activity and 111 
urbanization. Finally, both the narratives and the associated projections of socio-economic drivers were 112 
elaborated using a range of integrated assessment models in order to derive quantitative projections of 113 
energy, land use, and emissions associated with the SSPs.  114 
For the quantitative projections of economic growth and the integrated energy-land use-emissions 115 
scenarios, multiple models were used, which provided alternative interpretations of each of the SSPs. 116 
Among these interpretations so-called “marker” SSPs were selected as representative of the broader 117 
developments of each SSP. The selection of markers was guided by two main considerations:  the 118 
internal consistency of the full set of SSP markers, and the ability of the different models to represent 119 
distinct characteristics of the storylines. Identifying the markers involved an iterative process with 120 
multiple rounds of internal and external reviews. The process helped to ensure that marker scenarios 121 
were particularly scrutinized in terms of their representativeness for individual SSPs and that the relative 122 
differences between models were well represented in the final set of SSP markers. It is important to 123 
note that while the markers can be interpreted as representative of a specific SSP development, they 124 
are not meant to provide a central or median estimate. The “non-marker” scenarios are important, since 125 
they provide insights into possible alternative scenario interpretations of the same basic SSP elements 126 
and storylines, including a first-order estimate of the (conditional) uncertainties attending to model 127 
structure and interpretation/implementation of the storylines. In addition, the non-marker scenarios 128 
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help to understand the robustness of different elements of the SSPs (see also section 7, below). An 129 
important caveat, however, is that the SSP uncertainty ranges are often based on different sample sizes, 130 
as not all modelling teams have so far developed a scenario for each of the SSPs. Note also that our 131 
results should not be regarded as a full representation of the underlying uncertainties. The results are 132 
based on a relatively limited number of three models for the GDP projections and six models for the IAM 133 
scenarios. Additional models or other variants of the SSP narratives  would influence some of our 134 
results. As part of future research, additional SSP scenarios are expected to be generated by a wide 135 
range of IAMs to add further SSP interpretations. This will further increase the robustness of uncertainty 136 
ranges for individual SSPs and estimates of differences between SSPs.. The set of results comprises 137 
quantitative estimates for population, economic growth, energy system parameters, land use, 138 
emissions, and concentrations. All the data are publicly available through the interactive SSP web-139 
database at https://secure.iiasa.ac.at/web-apps/ene/SspDb.  140 
The current set of SSP scenarios consists of a set of baselines, which provides a description of future 141 
developments in absence of new climate policies beyond those in place today, as well as mitigation 142 
scenarios which explore the implications of climate change mitigation policies. The baseline SSP 143 
scenarios should be considered as reference cases for mitigation, climate impacts and adaptation 144 
analyses. Therefore, and similar to the vast majority of other scenarios in the literature, the SSP 145 
scenarios presented here do not consider feedbacks from the climate system on its key drivers such as 146 
socioeconomic impacts of climate change. The mitigation scenarios were developed focusing on the 147 
forcing levels covered by the RCPs. The resulting combination of SSPs with RCPs constitutes a first 148 
comprehensive application of the scenario matrix (van Vuuren et al., 2014) from the perspective of 149 
emissions mitigation (Section 6.3). Importantly, the SSPs and the associated scenarios presented here 150 
are only meant as a starting point for the application of the new scenario framework in climate change 151 
research. Important next steps will be the analysis of climate impacts and adaptation, the adoption of 152 
SSP emissions scenarios in the next round of climate change projections and the exploration of broader 153 
sustainability implications of climate change and climate policies under the different SSPs. 154 
In the remainder of the paper we first describe in Section 2 the methods of developing the SSPs in more 155 
detail. Subsequently, Section 3 presents an overview of the narratives. The basic SSP elements in terms 156 
of key scenario driving forces for population, economic growth and urbanization are discussed in 157 
Section 4. Outcomes for energy, land-use change and the resulting emissions in baseline scenarios are 158 
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presented in Section 5, while Section 6 focuses on the SSP mitigation scenarios. Finally, Section 7 159 
concludes and discusses future steps in SSP research.  160 
2. Methods 161 
2.1 Basic elements and baseline scenarios 162 
The SSPs have been developed to provide five distinctly different pathways about future socioeconomic 163 
developments as they might unfold in the absence of explicit additional policies and measures to limit 164 
climate forcing or to enhance adaptive capacity. They are intended to enable climate change research 165 
and policy analysis, and are designed to span a wide range of combinations of challenges to mitigation 166 
and adaptation to climate change. The resulting storylines, however, are broader than these dimensions 167 
alone – and in fact some of their elements nicely align with scenarios from earlier exercises in the past 168 
(Nakicenovic and Swart, 2000; van Vuuren and Carter, 2014). 169 
The development of the SSPs comprised five main steps as illustrated in Figure 1: 170 
• Design of the narratives, providing the fundamental underlying logic for each SSP, focusing also 171 
on those elements of socioeconomic change that often cannot be covered by formal models.  172 
• Extensions of the narratives in terms of model “input tables”, describing in qualitative terms the 173 
main SSP characteristics  and scenario assumptions. 174 
• Elaboration of the basic elements of the SSPs in terms of demographic and economic drivers 175 
using quantitative models. 176 
• Elaboration of developments in the energy system, land use and greenhouse gas and air 177 
pollutant emissions of the SSP baseline scenarios using a set of Integrated Assessment Models 178 
(IAMs)  179 
• Elaboration of these elements by IAMs for the SSP mitigation scenarios. 180 
The narratives of the SSPs (O'Neill et al., 2016a) were developed using large expert teams that together 181 
designed the storylines and ensured their internal consistency. Similarly, different interdisciplinary 182 
groups of experts (5-10 people) participated in the development of the model input tables, ensuring 183 
sufficient discussion on the interpretation of the different elements (see, e.g., O’Neill et al. (2016a), KC 184 
and Lutz (2016), and Appendix A and E of the Supplementary Material).  185 
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For each SSP, a single population, education (KC and Lutz, 2016) and urbanization projection (Jiang and 186 
O'Neill, 2016) was developed, while three different economic modeling teams participated in the 187 
development of the GDP projections (Crespo Cuaresma, 2016; Dellink et al., 2016; Leimbach et al., 188 
2016). The GDP projections by Dellink et al. were selected as the representative ‘marker’ SSP 189 
projections. As a next step, the IAM models used the marker GDP and population projections as 190 
quantitative inputs for developing the SSP scenarios. Six alternative IAM models were used for the 191 
quantification of the SSP baseline scenarios. For each SSP a single IAM interpretation was selected as the 192 
so-called representative marker scenario for recommended use by future analyses of climate change, its 193 
impacts and response measures (recognizing that often the full space of available scenarios cannot be 194 
analyzed). In addition to the marker scenario, each SSP was interpreted by other IAM models, leading to 195 
multiple non-marker IAM scenarios for each SSP narrative. The multi-model approach was important for 196 
understanding the robustness of the results and the (conditional) uncertainties associated with the 197 
different SSPs.  198 
Differences between the full set of SSP scenarios include those that are attributable to differences 199 
across the underlying narratives, differences in the quantitative interpretation of a given narrative, and 200 
differences in IA model structure. For a given SSP, it is useful to have a variety of different quantitative 201 
scenarios, since they help to highlight the range of uncertainty that attends to model structures and 202 
different interpretations of SSPs. Similarly, SSP scenarios derived from a single IAM helps highlight 203 
differences due to variation of the SSP input assumptions alone (see, e.g., the marker papers listed in 204 
Table 1). In sum six IAM models participated in the scenario development and five models provided the 205 
associated marker scenarios of the five SSPs (see Table 1). Finally, the GHG and aerosol emissions from 206 
the IAM models were used in the simple climate model MAGICC-6 (Meinshausen et al., 2011a; 207 
Meinshausen et al., 2011b) in order to provide insights into possible consequences for concentrations 208 
and related climate change. More documentation on the model systems used in this paper can be found 209 
in Appendix D of the Supplementary Material).  210 
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 211 
Figure 1: Schematic illustration of main steps in developing the SSPs, including the narratives, socioeconomic scenario drivers 212 
(basic SSP elements), and SSP baseline and mitigation scenarios.  213 
 214 
Table 1: IAM models and their use for the development of the SSP scenarios (for further details on SSP scenarios by model 215 
see also Table 2 of the Supplementary Material) 216 
Model name 
(hosting institution) SSP Marker  
SSP coverage 
(# of scenarios) Model category Solution Algorithm 
AIM/CGE 
(NIES) 
SSP3 
(Fujimori et al., 
submitted) 
SSP1, SSP2, SSP3, 
SSP4, SSP5 
(22 scenarios) 
General equilibrium 
(GE) Recursive dynamic 
GCAM 
(PNNL) 
SSP4 
(Calvin et al., 
submitted) 
SSP1, SSP2, SSP3, 
SSP4, SSP5 
(20 scenarios) 
Partial equilibrium 
(PE) Recursive dynamic 
IMAGE 
(PBL) 
SSP1 
(van Vuuren et al., 
submitted) 
SSP1, SSP2, SSP3, 
(13 scenarios) 
Hybrid  
(systems dynamic 
model and GE for 
agriculture) 
Recursive dynamic 
MESSAGE-GLOBIOM 
(IIASA) 
SSP2 
(Fricko et al., 
submitted) 
SSP1, SSP2, SSP3, 
(13 scenarios) 
Hybrid  
(systems engineering 
partial equilibrium 
models linked to 
aggregated GE) 
Intertemporal 
optimization 
Mitigation 
scenarios
Six IAMs 
Five marker 
scenarios
 19 non-marker 
scenarios 
depicting 
uncertainties
Baseline
scenarios
NARRATIVES
(Storylines)
O
’N
ei
ll 
et
 a
l.
SSP scenario drivers
G
D
P
(1
) D
el
lin
k
et
 a
l, 
(2
) C
re
sp
o,
 
(3
) L
ai
m
ba
ch
et
 a
l
https://secure.iiasa.ac.at/web-apps/ene/SspDb/ 
Country projections:
GDP, POP, Education, 
Urbanization
IAM outputs for five regions:
- energy supply & demand (Bauer et al.)
- land-use & land-cover change (Popp et al.)
- GHG emissions
- air pollution and aerosol emissions (Rao et al.)
- mitigation costs
- prices, etc…
SSP Web-database
Models: AIM-CGE, GCAM, IMAGE, MESSAGE-GLOBIOM,
REMIND-MagPie, WITCH-GLOBIOM
 Shared policy 
assumptions
 Four long-term 
radiative forcing  
targets 
 81 mitigation 
scenarios
 Assessment of 
costs and 
feasibility
P
op
ul
at
io
n
U
rb
an
iz
at
io
n
KC
 &
 L
ut
z
Jia
ng
 &
 O
’N
ei
ll
Ca
lv
in
 e
t a
l.,
 K
rie
gl
er
 e
t a
l.,
 v
an
 V
uu
re
n 
et
 a
l.,
 R
ao
 e
t a
l.,
Fr
ic
ko
et
 a
l.,
 F
uj
im
or
i e
t a
l.,
 B
au
er
 e
t a
l.,
 P
op
p 
et
 a
l.,
 
Source: Riahi et al., 2016 
9 
 
REMIND-MAgPIE 
(PIK) 
SSP5 
(Kriegler et al., 
submitted) 
SSP1, SSP2, SSP5, 
(14 scenarios) 
General equilibrium 
(GE) 
Intertemporal 
optimization 
WITCH-GLOBIOM 
(FEEM) - 
SSP1, SSP2, SSP3, 
SSP4, SSP5 
(23 scenarios) 
General equilibrium 
(GE) 
Intertemporal 
optimization 
 217 
2.2 Development of mitigation scenarios 218 
We use the baseline SSP scenarios as the starting point for a comprehensive mitigation analysis. To 219 
maximize the usefulness of our assessment for the community scenario process, we select the nominal 220 
RCP forcing levels of 2.6, 4.5, and 6.0 W/m2 in 2100 as the long-term climate targets for our mitigation 221 
scenarios. A key reason for selecting these forcing levels is to provide a link between the SSPs and the 222 
RCPs developed in the initial phase of the community scenario process. Establishing this link is important 223 
as it will enable the impacts, adaptation and vulnerability (IAV) community to use the information on the 224 
SSPs in conjunction with the RCP climate projections archived in the CMIP5 data base (Taylor et al., 225 
2012). We thus try to get as close as possible to the original RCP forcing pathways, which sometimes 226 
deviate slightly from the 2100 forcing level indicated by the RCP-label (see Section 2 and Section 5 of the 227 
Supplementary Material). In addition, we explore mitigation runs for a target of 3.4 W/m2. This 228 
intermediate level of radiative forcing (approximately 550 ppm CO2-e) is located between very stringent 229 
efforts to reduce emissions given by RCP2.6 (approximately 450 ppm CO2-e) and less stringent 230 
mitigation efforts associated with RCP4.5 (approximately 650 ppm CO2-e). Exploring the level of 3.4 231 
W/m2 is particularly policy-relevant, considering, for example, recent discussions about scenarios and 232 
the attainability of the 2°C objective, which is broadly in line with scenarios aiming at 2.6 W/m2 (Kriegler 233 
et al., 2015; Kriegler et al., 2014b; Riahi et al., 2015; Victor and Kennel, 2014). On the other hand, recent 234 
developments in international climate policy (e.g., the newly adopted Paris Agreement under the United 235 
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change) have renewed attention to the importance of 236 
exploring temperature levels even lower than 2°C, in particular a long term limit of 1.5°C. These 237 
developments were too recent to be taken up already, but are considered in forthcoming work.  238 
Finally, since policies and their effectiveness can be expected to vary consistent with the underlying 239 
socioeconomic storylines, we define so-called Shared Policy Assumptions: SPAs (Kriegler et al., 2014a). 240 
The SPAs describe the climate mitigation policy environment for the different SSPs. They are discussed 241 
in more detail in Section 6 of the paper (and the Appendix B and Section 6 of the Supplementary 242 
Material). 243 
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3. SSP Narratives 244 
The SSP narratives (O'Neill et al., 2016a) comprise a textual description of how the future might unfold 245 
in terms of broad societal trends. Their main purpose is to provide an internally consistent logic of the 246 
main causal relationships, including a description of trends that are traditionally difficult to capture by 247 
models. In this sense, the SSP narratives are an important complement to the quantitative model 248 
projections. By describing major socioeconomic, demographic, technological, lifestyle, policy, 249 
institutional and other trends, the narratives add important context for a broad user community to 250 
better understand the foundation and meaning of the quantitative SSP projections. At the same time, 251 
the narratives have been a key input into the modeling process, since they underpin the quantifications 252 
and guided the selection of assumptions for the socioeconomic projections and the SSP energy and land-253 
use transitions described in this special issue.  254 
Consistent with the overall scenario framework , the narratives are designed to span a range of futures 255 
in terms of the socioeconomic challenges they imply for mitigating and adapting to climate change. Two 256 
of the SSPs describe futures where challenges to adaptation and mitigation are both low (SSP1) or both 257 
high (SSP3). In addition, two “asymmetric cases” are designed, comprising a case in which high 258 
challenges to mitigation is combined with low challenges to adaptation (SSP5), and a case where the 259 
opposite is true (SSP4). Finally a central case describes a world with intermediate challenges for both 260 
adaptation and mitigation (SSP2).  261 
In Table 2 we provide a short summary of the global narratives, which have been used throughout all 262 
the papers of this special issue. O’Neill et al. (2016a) provides a more detailed description and discussion 263 
of the narratives. In addition, the Supplementary Material (Section 4 and Appendix A) includes specific 264 
descriptions of how the global narratives were extended to provide further guidance on scenario 265 
assumptions concerning energy demand and supply, technological change, and land-use changes.  266 
While the SSPs employ a different scenario design and logic compared to earlier IPCC scenarios, such as 267 
the SRES scenarios (Nakicenovic and Swart, 2000), their narratives as well as some of their scenario 268 
characteristics show interesting similarities. Analogies between the SRES scenarios and the SSPs were 269 
identified already during the SSP development phase (Kriegler et al., 2012; O’Neill et al., 2014), and a 270 
systematic attempt to map the SSPs to SRES and other major scenarios was conducted by van Vuuren 271 
and Carter (2014). They find that particularly the “symmetric” SSPs (where both the challenges to 272 
mitigation and to adaptation are either high or low) show large similarities to some of the SRES scenario 273 
11 
 
families. For example, there is a clear correspondence between the sustainability focused worlds of SSP1 274 
and SRES B1. Similarly, the fragmented world of SRES A2 shares many scenario characteristics with SSP3, 275 
which is describing a world dominated by regional rivalry. The middle-of-the-road scenario SSP2 276 
corresponds well to the dynamics-as-usual scenario SRES B2. And finally, SSP5 shares many storyline 277 
elements with the A1FI scenario of SRES, both depicting high fossil-fuel reliance and high economic 278 
growth leading to high GHG emissions.  For further details about the mapping of the SSPs and earlier 279 
scenarios see van Vuuren and Carter (2014). 280 
  281 
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Table 2:  Summary of SSP Narratives 282 
 283 
SSP1 
Sustainability – Taking the Green Road (Low challenges to mitigation and adaptation) 
The world shifts gradually, but pervasively, toward a more sustainable path, emphasizing more 
inclusive development that respects perceived environmental boundaries. Management of the 
global commons slowly improves, educational and health investments accelerate the 
demographic transition, and the emphasis on economic growth shifts toward a broader 
emphasis on human well-being. Driven by an increasing commitment to achieving development 
goals, inequality is reduced both across and within countries. Consumption is oriented toward 
low material growth and lower resource and energy intensity.  
SSP2 
Middle of the Road (Medium challenges to mitigation and adaptation) 
The world follows a path in which social, economic, and technological trends do not shift 
markedly from historical patterns. Development and income growth proceeds unevenly, with 
some countries making relatively good progress while others fall short of expectations.  Global 
and national institutions work toward but make slow progress in achieving sustainable 
development goals. Environmental systems experience degradation, although there are some 
improvements and overall the intensity of resource and energy use declines. Global population 
growth is moderate and levels off in the second half of the century. Income inequality persists or 
improves only slowly and challenges to reducing vulnerability to societal and environmental 
changes remain. 
SSP3  
Regional Rivalry – A Rocky Road (High challenges to mitigation and adaptation) 
A resurgent nationalism, concerns about competitiveness and security, and regional conflicts 
push countries to increasingly focus on domestic or, at most, regional issues. Policies shift over 
time to become increasingly oriented toward national and regional security issues. Countries 
focus on achieving energy and food security goals within their own regions at the expense of 
broader-based development. Investments in education and technological development decline. 
Economic development is slow, consumption is material-intensive, and inequalities persist or 
worsen over time. Population growth is low in industrialized and high in developing countries. A 
low international priority for addressing environmental concerns leads to strong environmental 
degradation in some regions.  
SSP4 
Inequality – A Road Divided (Low challenges to mitigation, high challenges to adaptation) 
Highly unequal investments in human capital, combined with increasing disparities in economic 
opportunity and political power, lead to increasing inequalities and stratification both across and 
within countries. Over time, a gap widens between an internationally-connected society that 
contributes to knowledge- and capital-intensive sectors of the global economy, and a 
fragmented collection of lower-income, poorly educated societies that work in a labor intensive, 
low-tech economy. Social cohesion degrades and conflict and unrest become increasingly 
common. Technology development is high in the high-tech economy and sectors. The globally 
connected energy sector diversifies, with investments in both carbon-intensive fuels like coal and 
unconventional oil, but also low-carbon energy sources. Environmental policies focus on local 
issues around middle and high income areas.  
SSP5 
Fossil-fueled Development – Taking the Highway (High challenges to mitigation, low 
challenges to adaptation) 
This world places increasing faith in competitive markets, innovation and participatory societies 
to produce rapid technological progress and development of human capital as the path to 
sustainable development. Global markets are increasingly integrated. There are also strong 
investments in health, education, and institutions to enhance human and social capital. At the 
same time, the push for economic and social development is coupled with the exploitation of 
abundant fossil fuel resources and the adoption of resource and energy intensive lifestyles 
around the world. All these factors lead to rapid growth of the global economy, while global 
population peaks and declines in the 21st century. Local environmental problems like air pollution 
are successfully managed. There is faith in the ability to effectively manage social and ecological 
systems, including by geo-engineering if necessary.  
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4. Demographic and Economic Drivers  284 
The second step in developing the SSPs comprised the translation of the qualitative narratives into 285 
quantitative projections for the main socioeconomic drivers of the SSPs: population, education, 286 
urbanization, and economic development. These projections comprise the basic elements of the SSPs 287 
and were constructed at the country level. Aggregated results for the world are shown in Figure 2. 288 
The SSP population projections (KC and Lutz, 2016) use a multi-dimensional demographic model to 289 
project national populations based on alternative assumptions on future fertility, mortality, migration 290 
and educational transitions. The projections are designed to be consistent with the five SSP storylines. 291 
They are cross-classified by age and gender as well as the level of education - with assumptions for 292 
female education strongly influencing fertility and hence population growth. The alternative fertility, 293 
mortality, and migration assumptions are derived partly from the storylines, reflecting also different 294 
educational compositions of the population. The outcomes in terms of total global population sizes of 295 
the SSPs cover a wide range. Consistent with the narratives, population is lowest in the SSP1 and SSP5 296 
reaching about 7 billion people by 2100 and the highest in SSP3 reaching 12.6 billion in 2100. The middle 297 
of the road scenario (SSP2) depicts a population peaking at 9.4 billion (Figure 2). Compared to the SRES 298 
scenarios (Nakicenovic and Swart, 2000), i.e., the previous set of socioeconomic community scenarios, 299 
the new set covers a lower range. This is primarily due to the decline of fertility rates in emerging 300 
economies over the last two decades as well as the recent expansion of education among young women 301 
in least developed countries. Outcomes in terms of educational composition, which has important 302 
implications for economic growth and for vulnerability to climate change impacts, also vary widely 303 
across SSPs. In SSP1 and SSP5 composition improves dramatically, with the global average education 304 
level in 2050 reaching about the current level in Europe. SSP2 also shows substantial increases in 305 
educational composition, while in SSP3 and SSP4 increases are small and the global average education 306 
level even declines somewhat late in the century.  307 
Similarly, the quantification of the urbanization trends follow the storylines (Jiang and O'Neill, 2016). 308 
The projections show that the world continues to urbanize across all SSPs, but rates of urbanization 309 
differ widely across them, with urbanization reaching between 60% (SSP3), 80% (SSP2), and 92% (SSP1, 310 
SSP4, SSP5) by the end of century (Figure 2). This range is much wider compared to earlier projections 311 
(Grübler et al., 2007). The middle of the road SSP2 projection is close to the UN median projection (UN, 312 
2014). In SSP3, urbanization is constrained by slow economic growth, limited mobility across regions and 313 
poor urban planning that makes cities unattractive destinations. By contrast, urbanization is assumed to 314 
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be rapid in both SSP1 and SSP5, which are associated with high income growth. Note, however, that in 315 
SSP1 urbanization is desired given the high efficiency that compact urban areas may achieve, while in 316 
SSP5 cities become attractive destinations due to other reasons, such as rapid technological change that 317 
allows for large-scale engineering projects to develop desirable housing. 318 
There are three sets of economic (GDP) projections for each SSP (Crespo Cuaresma, 2016; Dellink et al., 319 
2016; Leimbach et al., 2016). They were developed together with the demographic projections, in order 320 
to maintain consistency in assumptions with education and ageing. The three economic projections 321 
differ, however, in terms of their focus on different drivers of economic development (technological 322 
progress, efficiency improvements in energy use, income convergence dynamics or human capital 323 
accumulation). We employ Dellink et al. (2016) as the marker scenario for all SSPs to ensure consistency. 324 
The overall range of the SSPs is comparable to the range of earlier GDP projections in the literature 325 
(Figure 2). The highest SSP GDP projection (SSP5) depicts a very rapid development and convergence 326 
among countries with long-term global average income levels approaching almost 140,000 US$2005 per 327 
year in 2100. By contrast, the lowest projection (SSP3) depicts a development failure with strong 328 
fragmentation, leading to slow growth or long-term stagnation in most countries of the world. In the 329 
SSP3 world average income stays thus around 20,000 US$2005 per year in 2100 – this income level is 330 
broadly representative of the lowest long-term economic projections in the literature. In all scenarios, 331 
economic growth is projected to slow down over time, with average growth rates in the second half of 332 
the century roughly half of those in the first half. This slow-down is most marked in middle income 333 
countries. Note that all GDP projections were performed using international dollar in purchasing power 334 
parity (PPP) rates. An international dollar would buy in the cited country a comparable amount of goods 335 
and services a U.S. dollar would buy in the United States.  336 
The SSP GDP projections also depict major differences in terms of cross-national inequality. Consistent 337 
with the narratives, SSP4 is characterized by the highest levels of inequality, representing a trend-338 
reversal of the recent years (see the Gini index shown in panel D of Figure 2). Due to high fragmentation 339 
of the world, inequality also remains relatively high in SSP3 (compared to the other SSPs). The most 340 
equitable developments are depicted by SSP1 and SSP5, both featuring a rapid catch-up of the currently 341 
poor countries in the world. 342 
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   343 
Figure 2: Development of global population and education (A), urbanization (B), GDP (C), and GDP per capita and the Gini 344 
index (D). The inset in panel A gives the share of people without education at age of >14 years, and the inset in panel D 345 
denotes the development of the global (cross-national) Gini index. The SSPs are compared to ranges from other major 346 
studies in the literature, such as the IPCC AR5 (Clarke et al., 2014); SRES (Nakicenovic and Swart, 2000), UN, and Grübler et al. 347 
(2007). The colored areas for GDP (panel D) denote the range of alternative SSP GDP projections presented in this Special 348 
Issue (Dellink et al. (2016), Crespo Cuaresma (2016), Leimbach et al. (2016)). 349 
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5. SSP baseline scenarios 350 
5.1 Energy system 351 
The SSP baseline scenarios describe alternative path-dependent evolutions of the energy system 352 
consistent with the SSP narratives and the associated challenges for mitigation and adaptation. Overall, 353 
the SSPs depict vastly different energy futures, featuring a wide range of possible energy demand 354 
developments and energy supply structures (Figure 3). These differences emerge due to a combination 355 
of assumptions with respect to the main drivers of the energy system, including technological change, 356 
economic growth, emergence of new energy services, energy intensity of services, and assumptions with 357 
respect to costs and availability of future fossil fuel resources and their alternatives (see Appendix A of 358 
the Supplementary Material and Bauer et al. (submitted) for further details). 359 
The scale and structure of the future energy supply systems in the SSP scenarios are critical 360 
determinants of the challenges for mitigation and adaptation. Two of the SSP baseline scenarios (SSP3 361 
and SSP5) have a heavy reliance on fossil fuels with an increasing contribution of coal to the energy mix 362 
(Figure 3: panel A and B). In these two SSPs, the challenges for mitigation are thus high. By contrast, 363 
SSP1 and SSP4 depict worlds with low challenges to mitigation, and consequently increasing shares of 364 
renewables and other low-carbon energy carriers. The “middle of the road” narrative of SSP2 leads to a 365 
balanced energy development compared to the other SSPs, featuring a continuation of the current 366 
fossil-fuel dominated energy mix with intermediate challenges for both mitigation and adaptation. 367 
These characteristics are also shown by the “SSP triangle” in Figure 3. The corners of the triangle depict 368 
hypothetical situations where the energy system would rely either fully on coal, “oil & gas” or 369 
“renewables and nuclear”. In this energy triangle, baseline scenarios for SSP3 and SSP5 are moving with 370 
time closer to the left corner dominated by coal, while SSP1 and SSP4 scenarios are developing toward 371 
the renewable and nuclear corner. The SSP2 scenario stays in the middle of the triangle. 372 
The SSP baselines also span a wide range in terms of energy demand (Figure 3: Panel C), which is 373 
another major factor influencing the future challenges to mitigation and adaptation. At the upper end of 374 
the range, the SSP5 scenario exhibits a more than tripling of energy demand over the course of the 375 
century (primarily driven by rapid economic growth). As a result, SSP5 is characterized by high 376 
challenges to mitigation. Challenges to mitigation are lowest in SSP1 and SSP4 (Figure 3: Panel C), and 377 
this is reflected in the scale of energy demand in these scenarios. Demand is particularly low in the SSP1 378 
scenarios peaking around 2060 and declining thereafter due to successful implementation of energy 379 
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efficiency measures and behavioral changes. This leads to a global decoupling of energy demand from 380 
economic growth. Consistent with its intermediate mitigation challenges, final energy demand roughly 381 
doubles in the SSP2 scenario in the long term (2100) depicting a middle of the road pathway. Overall, 382 
the range of energy demand projections associated with the SSPs is broadly representative of the 383 
literature (covering about the 90th percentile range of the scenarios assessed in the IPCC AR5 (Clarke et 384 
al., 2014)). 385 
Last but not least, the SSPs provide very different interpretations for energy access and poverty, which is 386 
an important indicator of the challenge to adaptation across the SSPs. The SSP3 and SSP4 baseline 387 
scenarios, for example, depict a failure of current policies for energy access, leading to continued and 388 
increased use of biomass in the households of developing countries (as defined today). By contrast, the 389 
use of coal and traditional biomass in households is reduced significantly in the other three baseline 390 
scenarios, which all portray comparatively more equitable worlds and thus also lower challenges for 391 
adaptation.  392 
 393 
Figure 3: Primary energy structure (Panel A + B) and final energy demand (Panel C) of the SSP marker scenarios and 394 
corresponding ranges.  395 
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5.2 Land-use change 397 
While there is a relatively long tradition of modeling comparisons in the area of energy-economic 398 
modeling (Clarke et al., 2009; Clarke et al., 2014; Edenhofer et al., 2010; Kriegler et al., 2015; Kriegler et 399 
al., 2014b; Riahi et al., 2015; Tavoni et al., 2015), there are fewer examples of systematic cross-model 400 
comparisons of land-use scenarios.  Notable exceptions include (Nelson et al., 2014; Popp et al., 2014; 401 
Schmitz et al., 2014; Smith et al., 2010; Von Lampe et al., 2014). In this context, the SSPs are the first 402 
joint community effort in developing land-use scenarios based on common narratives as well as a 403 
harmonized set of drivers.  404 
All SSP scenarios depict land-use changes in response to agricultural and industrial demands, such as 405 
food, timber, but also bioenergy. The nature and direction of these changes are, however, 406 
fundamentally different across the SSPs. They reflect land-use specific storylines that have been 407 
developed based on the SSP narratives (Popp et al., submitted) and which have guided assumptions on 408 
regulations, demand, productivity, environmental impacts, trade and the degree of globalization of 409 
future agricultural and forestry markets.  410 
The land-use change components of the SSP baseline scenarios cover a broad range of possible futures. 411 
For example, the scenarios show that in the future total cultivated land can expand or contract by 412 
hundreds of millionsmillions of hectares over this century (Figure 4). Massive growth of population, 413 
relatively low agricultural productivity, and little emphasis on environmental protection makes SSP3 a 414 
scenario with comparatively large pressure on the global land-use system. The resulting land-use 415 
pattern is one with large-scale losses of forests and other natural lands due to an expansion of cropland 416 
and pasture land (Figure 4). In comparison, the SSP1 scenario features a sustainable land transformation 417 
with comparatively little pressure on land resources due to low population projections, healthy diets 418 
with limited food waste, and high agricultural productivity. Consistent with its narrative, this scenario 419 
depicts a reversal of historical trends, including a gradual, global-scale, and pervasive expansion of 420 
forests and other natural lands. All other SSP scenarios feature modest changes in land-use with some 421 
expansion of overall cultivated lands (Figure 4).     422 
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 423 
 424 
Figure 4: Changes in cropland, forest, pasture and other natural land for the SSP marker baseline scenarios (thick lines) and 425 
ranges of other non-marker scenarios (colored areas). Changes are shown relative to the base year of 2010 = 0. In addition to 426 
the SSP baseline scenarios also the development of the RCPs (van Vuuren et al, 2011) and the range of the IPCC AR5 427 
scenarios are shown (Clarke et al, 2014). Note that cropland includes energy crops. Other natural land includes all land-428 
categories beyond forests, pasture, cropland, and build-up areas (the latter category is comparatively small and has not been 429 
quantified by all models).   430 
5.3 Baseline emissions and climate change  431 
The pathways for the energy and land-use systems in the SSP scenarios translate into a wide range of 432 
GHG and pollutant emissions, broadly representative of the baseline range of the literature (Figure 5).  433 
This is particularly the case for CO2 emissions, which are strongly correlated with the future challenges 434 
for mitigation. The higher dependence on fossil fuels in the SSP3 and SSP5 baselines result in higher CO2 435 
emissions and a higher mitigation challenge. Similarly, comparatively low fossil fuel dependence and 436 
increased deployment of non-fossil energy sources (SSP1 and SSP4) results in lower CO2 emissions and 437 
2000 2020 2040 2060 2080 2100
m
illi
on
 h
a
-600
-400
-200
0
200
400
600
800
1000
Other Natural Land
RCP 6.0
RCP 2.6
2000 2020 2040 2060 2080 2100
m
illi
on
 h
a
-2000
-1500
-1000
-500
0
500
1000
Pasture
RCP 4.5
RCP 2.6
2000 2020 2040 2060 2080 2100
m
illi
on
 h
a 
-600
-400
-200
0
200
400
600
800
Cropland
2000 2020 2040 2060 2080 2100
m
illi
on
 h
a
-600
-500
-400
-300
-200
-100
0
100
200
300
400
AR5 scenarios (max)
RCP 6.0
Forest
SSP1
SSP2
SSP3
SSP4
SSP5
20 
 
lower mitigation challenges (Figure 5). The SSP2 baseline depicts an intermediate emissions pathway 438 
compared to the other baselines, featuring a doubling of CO2 emissions over the course of the century.  439 
CH4 is the second largest contributor to global warming (after CO2). Current global emissions are 440 
dominated by non-energy sources like livestock, manure management, rice cultivation and enteric 441 
fermentation. To a lesser extent energy-related sources, including the production and transport of coal, 442 
natural gas, and oil, contribute to the emissions. Population growth and food demand is a strong driver 443 
of future CH4 emissions across the SSPs. It is thus not surprising that CH4 emissions are highest in the 444 
SSP3 baseline and lowest in SSP1. The combination of different energy and non-energy drivers leads in 445 
all other SSPs to intermediate levels of CH4 emissions in the long term. Perhaps noteworthy is the rapid 446 
increase of CH4 emissions in the SSP5 baseline in the near term, which is primarily due to the massive 447 
expansion of the fossil fuel infrastructure, particularly for the extraction and distribution of natural gas.  448 
Important sources of N2O emissions today include agricultural soil, animal manure, sewage, industry, 449 
automobiles and biomass burning. Agricultural soils and fertilization are the by far largest contributors 450 
of N2O emissions, and remain so across all the SSPs. Emissions are highest in the SSP3 and SSP4 451 
baselines due to high population and/or fertilizer use. N2O emissions are lowest in SSP1, featuring 452 
sustainable agricultural practices and low population assumptions. 453 
In summary, we find that total CO2 and CO2-eq. greenhouse gas emissions and the resulting radiative 454 
forcing correlate well with the challenges to mitigation across the SSPs. The results show at the same 455 
time, however, that plausible and internally consistent scenarios will not follow strictly the same ranking 456 
across all emissions categories (or across all SSP characteristics). It’s thus important to note that the 457 
aggregated challenge for mitigation and adaptation is not only determined by the baseline but also the 458 
climate policy assumptions. The latter critically influence the effectiveness of climate policies, which are 459 
introduced on top of the baselines (see next section).  460 
An important feature of the SSPs is that they cover a much wider range for air pollutant emissions than 461 
the RCPs (Rao et al., submitted). This is so since all the RCPs included similar assumptions about future 462 
air pollution legislation, assuming that the stringency of respective emissions standards would increase 463 
with raising affluence. It was not intended that the RCPs cover the full range of possible air pollutant 464 
emissions. In contrast, the SSPs are based on distinctly different air pollution storylines consistent with 465 
the overall SSP narratives. Particularly the upper bound projection of SSP3 features a world with slow 466 
introduction of air pollution legislation as well as implementation failures, leading to much higher air 467 
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pollution emissions levels than in any of the RCPs (see Figure 5). For further details of the air pollution 468 
dimension of the SSPs, see Rao et al (submitted) in this special issue.  469 
The resulting radiative forcing of the climate system is shown in the last panel of Figure 5. The SSP 470 
baselines cover a wide range between about 5.0 to 8.7 W/m2 by 2100. Perhaps most importantly, we 471 
find that only one single SSP baseline scenario of the full set –SSP5– reaches radiative forcing levels as 472 
high as the one from RCP8.5. This is consistent across all IAM models that attempted to run the SSPs. As 473 
the SSPs systematically cover plausible combinations of the primary drivers of emissions, this finding 474 
suggests that 8.5 W/m2 can only emerge under a relatively narrow range of circumstances. In contrast, 475 
an intermediate baseline (SSP2) only produces a forcing signal of about 6.5 W/m2 (range 6.5 to 7.3 476 
W/m2). The lack of other SSP scenarios with climate forcing of 8.5 W/m2 or above has important 477 
implications for impact studies, since SSP5 is characterized by low vulnerability and low challenges to 478 
adaptation. In order to add a high-end counterfactual for impacts to the current set of SSPs, it might be 479 
useful to develop a variant of an SSP that would combine high vulnerability with high climate forcing. 480 
This could be achieved for example by adding an alternative SSP3 interpretation with higher economic 481 
growth, to test whether such scenarios might lead to higher emissions consistent with RCP8.5 (see e.g., 482 
Ren et al., (2015)). The current SSP3 marker scenario leads to a radiative forcing of 7.2 W/m2 (range 6.7 483 
to 8.0 W/m2). 484 
The SSP1 baseline scenarios show the lowest climate signal of  about 5 W/m2 (range of 5.0 to 5.8 W/m2). 485 
In order to reach radiative forcing levels below 5 W/m2 it is thus necessary to introduce climate change 486 
mitigation policies, which are discussed in the next section. 487 
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  488 
 489 
Figure 5: Global emissions and global average change in radiative forcing. SSP baseline marker scenarios (and ranges of SSP non-marker baseline scenarios) are compared to 490 
the RCPs (van Vuuren et al, 2011) and the full range of the IPCC AR5 scenarios (Clarke et al, 2014). 491 
Aerosol & Air Pollutant Emissions (Sulfur, Black Carbon, etc..)
Greenhouse Gas Emissions (CO2, CH4, N2O, etc..)
2000 2020 2040 2060 2080 2100
C
O
2 
(M
tC
O
2)
-20
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
2000 2020 2040 2060 2080 2100
C
H
4 
(M
t C
H
4)
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
700
800
900
2000 2020 2040 2060 2080 2100
N
2O
 (M
t N
20
)
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
2000 2020 2040 2060 2080 2100
R
ad
ia
tiv
e 
Fo
rc
in
g 
(W
/m
2)
0
2
4
6
8
10
2000 2020 2040 2060 2080 2100
S
ul
fu
r (
M
t S
)
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
160
CO2
Sulfur Radiative ForcingBlack Carbon
CH4 N2O
RCP 4.5
RCP 4.5c
RCP 6.0
RCP 4.5
SSP1
SSP2
SSP3
SSP4
SSP5
2000 2020 2040 2060 2080 2100
B
la
ck
 C
ar
bo
n 
(M
t B
C
)
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
23 
 
6. SSP mitigation scenarios 492 
This section provides an overview of the SSP mitigation scenarios. Further details on the baseline and 493 
mitigation scenarios for individual SSPs can be found in this special issue in the five SSP marker scenario 494 
papers (Calvin et al., submitted; Fricko et al., submitted; Fujimori et al., submitted; Kriegler et al., 495 
submitted; van Vuuren et al., submitted) and two cross-cut papers on the SSP energy (Bauer et al., 496 
submitted) and land-use transitions (Popp et al., submitted).  497 
6.1 Shared Climate Policy Assumptions 498 
Mitigation costs and attainability of climate targets depend strongly on the design and effectiveness of 499 
future mitigation policies. Likewise, adaptation costs and the ability to buffer climate impacts depend on 500 
the scope and effectiveness of adaptation measures. These policies may differ greatly across the SSPs, 501 
and need to be consistent with the overall characteristic of the different narratives. Based on concepts 502 
from Kriegler et al. (2014a), we thus develop so-called shared climate policy assumptions (SPAs) for the 503 
implementation of the SSP mitigation scenarios. The mitigation SPAs describe in a generic way the most 504 
important characteristics of future mitigation policies, consistent with the overall SSP narrative as well 505 
as the SSP baseline scenario developments. More specifically, the mitigation SPAs describe critical issues 506 
for mitigation, such as the level of international cooperation (particularly in the short to medium term) 507 
and the stringency of the mitigation effort over time. The mitigation SPAs also define the coverage of 508 
different economic sectors, and particularly the land-use sector, which traditionally has been a 509 
challenging sector for mitigation in many countries.  510 
The definitions of the mitigation SPAs were derived by considering three main guiding principles: 1)      511 
The SPA/SSP combination is selected with the primary aim to reinforce the challenges for mitigation 512 
described by the relative position of each SSP in the challenges space; 2) the expected overall impact of 513 
the mitigation policy is selected to be consistent with the SSP storyline (for example, specific sectors or 514 
policy measures are less effective in some of the storylines compared to others); and 3) the mitigation 515 
SPAs are defined in broader terms only, providing the modeling teams a high degree of flexibility to 516 
choose between different possible policy instruments for the implementation of the SPAs into the IA 517 
models. The main assumptions of the mitigation SPAs are summarized in Table 3.  518 
Consistent with the storyline of strong fragmentation, poverty, and low capacity for mitigation, SSP3 519 
assumes an SPA with late accession of developing countries, as well as low effectiveness of the climate 520 
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policies in the agricultural and land sector (driven by rural poverty and low agricultural productivity). In 521 
comparison, the emphasis of SSP1 on sustainability results in this world in a highly effective and 522 
collaborative policy environment with globally comprehensive mitigation actions. Other SSPs combine 523 
different characteristics of the SPAs as shown in Table 3.  524 
The above SPAs and the different underlying socioeconomic and technological assumptions lead to 525 
distinctly different near-term (2030) GHG emissions developments across the SSP scenarios. In the 526 
context of the current international agreements, the marker scenarios of SSP1 and SSP4 depict low 527 
mitigation challenges and thus describe developments that allow a further strengthening of near-term 528 
mitigation measures beyond those described by the intended nationally determined contributions 529 
(INDCs) under the Paris agreement (UNFCCC, 2015). On the other hand, the INDCs are not fully achieved 530 
in the SSP marker scenarios with high challenges to mitigation (SSP3 and SSP5). Near-term emissions of 531 
the middle-of-the-road SSP2 marker scenario are broadly consistent with the INDCs (see Figure S5 in the 532 
Supplementary Material).  533 
Table 3: Summary of Shared Climate Policy Assumptions (SPAs) for mitigation. All SPAs foresee a period with moderate and 534 
regionally fragmented action until 2020, but differ in the development of mitigation policies thereafter (see Section 6 and 535 
Appendix B of the Supplementary Material for further details and definitions). 536 
 Policy stringency in the near term and the 
timing of regional participation 
Coverage of land use emissions 
SSP1, SSP4 
Early accession with global collaboration 
as of 2020 
SSP1, SSP5 
Effective coverage (at the level of emissions 
control in the energy and industrial sectors) 
SSP2, SSP5 
Some delays in establishing global action with 
regions transitioning to global cooperation 
between 2020-2040 
 
SSP2, SSP4 
Intermediately effective coverage (limited 
REDD*, but effective coverage of agricultural 
emissions) 
SSP3 
Late accession – higher income regions join global 
regime between 2020-2040, while lower income 
regions follow between 2030-2050  
SSP3 
 Very limited coverage (implementation failures 
and high transaction costs) 
*REDD: Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and forest Degradation 537 
Finally, it is important to note that while the adaptation dimension have not been quantified in the 538 
scenarios (see also Section 7 on Conclusions), the SSPs differ greatly with respect to the challenges to 539 
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adaptation as well as the associated effectiveness of possible adaptation policies (O'Neill et al., 2014). 540 
For example in SSP1, the capacity to adapt to climate change is high given the well-educated, rich 541 
population, the high degree of good governance and the high development of technologies. In addition, 542 
also the intact ecosystem services contribute to the adaptive capacity. In SSP3, on the other hand the 543 
capacity to adapt to climate change is relative low, given the large, poor population, the lack of 544 
cooperation and low of technology development. In SSP4, the capacity to adapt to climate change is 545 
relatively low for most of the population in each region, given the unequal distribution of resources. And 546 
finally in SSP5, the capacity to adapt to climate change is high given a highly educated and rich 547 
population as well as the high level of technology development. SSP2 depicts intermediate adaptation 548 
capacity compared to the other SSP scenarios. In future research, the SPAs will need to be extended by 549 
an adaptation dimension in order to integrate climate impacts and adaptation into the scenario analysis.   550 
 551 
6.2 Mitigation strategies 552 
The reduction of GHG emissions can be achieved through a wide portfolio of measures in the energy, 553 
industry and land-use sectors, the main sources of emissions and thus global warming (Clarke et al., 554 
2014). In the energy sector, the IA models employ a combination of measures to introduce structural 555 
changes through, e.g., replacement of carbon-intensive fossil fuels by cleaner alternatives (such as a 556 
switch from coal to natural gas, or the upscaling of renewable energy) and demand-side measures 557 
geared toward energy conservation and efficiency improvements (Bauer et al., submitted; Calvin et al., 558 
submitted; Fricko et al., submitted; Fujimori et al., submitted; Kriegler et al., submitted; Popp et al., 559 
submitted; van Vuuren et al., submitted). The latter include also the electrification of energy demand. In 560 
addition to structural changes, carbon capture and storage (CCS) can be employed to reduce the carbon-561 
intensity of fossil fuels or can even be combined with bioenergy conversion technologies for the delivery 562 
of energy services with potentially net negative emissions. Primary measures in the agricultural sector 563 
comprise reduction of CH4 and N2O emissions from various sources (livestock, rice, fertilizers) and 564 
dedicated measures to reduce deforestation and/or encourage afforestation and reforestation activities.  565 
The mitigation effort required to achieve a specific climate forcing target depends greatly on the SSP 566 
baseline scenario. Autonomous improvements in some baselines, e.g., in terms of carbon intensity 567 
and/or energy intensity (see SSP1, Figure 6) can greatly reduce the residual effort needed to attain long-568 
term mitigation targets. By the same token, however, the lack of structural changes in the baseline 569 
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(SSP5) or relatively high levels of energy intensity (SSP3) inevitably translate into the need for 570 
comparatively higher mitigation efforts.  571 
This path-dependency of mitigation is illustrated in Figure 6. It is shown how the introduction of climate 572 
policies leads to concurrent improvements of both the energy and the carbon intensity of the economy. 573 
At the same time, the figure also clearly illustrates that the required relative “movement” of the 574 
mitigation scenarios (i.e., the combination of measures for carbon and energy intensity) are strongly 575 
dependent on the position of the baseline (in Figure 6). For example, the carbon and energy intensity 576 
improvement rates of the SSP3 baseline are slower even than the recent historical rate (1971-2010). 577 
Hence, the distance of the SSP3 baseline to reach stringent climate targets - such as limiting 578 
temperature change to below 2°C (see Figure 6) - is much larger than, for example, the distance for the 579 
SSP1 baseline scenario. As a matter of fact reaching the lowest target of 2.6 W/m2 from an SSP3 baseline 580 
was found infeasible across all IAM models (Figure 8).  581 
Achieving stringent climate targets requires a fundamental transformation of the energy system, 582 
including the rapid upscaling of low-carbon energy (renewables, nuclear and CCS) (Figure 7). 583 
Independently of the SSP, we find that for reaching 3.4 W/m2 about half of the energy system (range: 584 
30-60%) will need to be supplied by low-carbon options in 2050, while for 2.6 W/m2 these options need 585 
to supply even about 60% (range: 40-70%) of the global energy demand in 2050. This corresponds to an 586 
increase of low-carbon energy share by more than a factor of three compared to today (in 2010 the low-587 
carbon share was 17%). In comparison, none of the SSP baselines show structural changes that are 588 
comparable to the requirements of 3.4 or 2.6 W/m2. Only the SSP1 baseline depicts noteworthy 589 
increases reaching a contribution of about 30% of low-carbon energy by 2050 (most SSP3 and SSP5 590 
baseline scenarios are showing even a decline of the share of low-carbon energy by 2050 in absence of 591 
additional climate policies). 592 
CCS plays an important role in many of the mitigation scenarios even though its deployment is subject to 593 
large uncertainties (Figure 7, right panel). Therefore, depending on the SSP interpretation of different 594 
models, the contribution of CCS ranges from zero to almost 1900 GtCO2. As shown by the marker SSP 595 
scenarios, fossil-intensive baselines, such as SSP3 and SSP5, show generally higher needs for CCS 596 
compared to less fossil-intensive baselines. Consistent with the narrative of sustainability, the 597 
contribution of CCS is lowest in the SSP1 marker scenario (Figure 7). 598 
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Important mitigation options outside the energy sector include reduced deforestation, the expansion of 599 
forest land cover (afforestation and/or reforestation) as well as the reduction of the greenhouse gas 600 
intensity of agriculture (Figure 7, middle panel). While uncertainties for land-based mitigation options 601 
are generally among the largest, we nevertheless find that the mitigation strategies of the marker SSP 602 
scenarios reflect well the underlying narratives (see also Popp et al. (submitted)). The expansion of 603 
forest land cover is an important factor in the mitigation scenarios of the SSP1 marker (Figure 7), 604 
followed by SSP2 and SSP4. The IAM model of the SSP5 marker does not consider mitigation-induced 605 
afforestation, implying that CO2 emissions from land use are phased out by reducing and eventually 606 
eliminating deforestation in all SSP5 mitigation cases, but no expansion of forest area and associated 607 
CO2 withdrawal occurs. Finally, the SSP3 marker scenario shows a different dynamic due to high 608 
pressure on land. Already the SSP3 baseline is characterized by shrinking forest areas. This trend is 609 
further accelerated in the mitigation scenarios due to the expansion of bioenergy. SSP3 depicts thus a 610 
future world with massive challenges for land-based mitigation, where GHG policies add further 611 
pressure on the land system, resulting in competition for scarce resources between food and bioenergy 612 
production.  613 
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   614 
Figure 6: Annual long-term improvement rates of energy intensity (final energy/GDP) and carbon intensity (CO2/final 615 
energy). Development in the SSP baseline and mitigation scenarios are compared to scenarios consistent with a likely chance 616 
to stay below 2°C from the IPCC AR5 (shaded area). Large icons and colored lines denote the SSP marker and associated 617 
mitigation scenarios. Smaller icons denote non-marker IAM interpretations of the SSPs.  618 
  619 
 620 
Figure 7: Major mitigation options in the energy and land-use sector: (a) upscaling of low carbon energy by 2050, (b) 621 
expansion of forest land-cover by 2050, and (c) contribution of cumulative CCS over the course of the century. The range of 622 
the SSP baseline scenarios are shown as colored bars. Horizontal black lines within the colored bars give the relative position 623 
of the SSP baseline marker scenarios. The full range of results for the mitigation scenarios are shown as grey bars. Colored 624 
symbols within the grey bars denote the relative position of the marker mitigation scenarios and the horizontal black lines 625 
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within the grey bars denote the median across the mitigation scenarios. Note that the number of scenarios differs across the 626 
different baseline and mitigation bars.  627 
6.3 Mitigation costs and attainability 628 
The comprehensive mitigation experiments enable us to fill the “matrix” of the scenario framework with 629 
mitigation costs from different SSP scenarios (see Figure 8 and Section 1 of the Supplementary 630 
Material). For each mitigation target (i.e., 2100 forcing level) and each SSP we have computed costs for 631 
the SSP marker model as well as associated ranges of other non-marker IAMs.  632 
Mitigation costs are shown in terms of the net present value (NPV) of the average global carbon price 633 
over the course of the century. The price is calculated as the weighted average across regions using a 634 
discount rate of 5%. We select this cost metric since not all models are able to compute full 635 
macroeconomic costs in terms of GDP or consumption losses. Results for those models that report these 636 
cost metrics can be found in Section 1 of the Supplementary Material.  637 
Our results are consistent with other major comparison studies (Clarke et al., 2014; Kriegler et al., 2015; 638 
Riahi et al., 2015) which suggest that carbon prices for achieving specific climate targets may vary 639 
significantly across models and scenarios. For example, the average carbon prices for the target of 2.6 640 
W/m2 differ in our analysis by about a factor of three across the marker scenarios from about 9 $/tCO2 in 641 
the SSP1 marker to about 25 $/tCO2 in the SSP5 marker. Our highest estimate across all scenarios (>100 642 
$/tCO2) is representative of about the 90th percentile of comparable scenarios assessed by the IPCC AR5 643 
(category I scenarios, see Clarke et al, 2014), while the lowest in our scenario set is lower than 644 
comparable estimates from AR5. In other words, we are able to cover with our limited set of models a 645 
large part of the overall literature range. The average carbon price in the middle-of-the-road SSP2-2.6 646 
W/m2 scenario is about 10 $/tCO2 (range: 10-110 $/tCO2, Figure 8). The SSP2 marker costs are 647 
somewhat lower than the median cost estimate of the scenarios for similar targets assessed by the IPCC 648 
AR5 (30 $/tCO2). The wide range of costs is also an important indication that (consistent with our 649 
original objective), the scenarios cover a significant range with respect to the challenges for mitigation. 650 
Perhaps more importantly, we can consistently relate the differences in the mitigation costs to 651 
alternative assumptions on future socioeconomic, technological and political developments. This 652 
illustrates the importance of considering alternative SSPs and SPAs and their critical role in determining 653 
the future mitigation challenges.  654 
Consistent with the narratives, mitigation costs and thus the challenge for mitigation is found lower in 655 
SSP1 & SSP4 relative to SSP3 & SSP5 (Figure 8). Perhaps most importantly, we find that not all targets 656 
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are necessarily attainable from all SSPs. Specifically the 2.6 W/m2 target was found by all models 657 
infeasible to reach from an SSP3 baseline, and the WITCH-GLOBIOM model found it infeasible to reach 658 
the target in SSP5 (all other models reached 2.6 W/m2 from SSP5). The fact that IAMs could not find a 659 
solution for  some of the 2.6 W/m2 scenarios needs to be distinguished from the notion of infeasibility in 660 
the real world. As indicated by Riahi et al. (2015) model infeasibilities may occur for different reasons, 661 
such as lack of mitigation options to reach the specified climate target; binding constraints for the 662 
diffusion of technologies or extremely high price signals under which the modeling framework can no 663 
longer be solved. Thus, infeasibility in this case is an indication that under the specific  socioeconomic 664 
and policy assumptions of the SSP3 scenario (and to a less extent also SSP5 scenario) the transformation 665 
cannot be achieved. It provides useful context for understanding technical or economic concerns. These 666 
concerns need to be strictly differentiated from the feasibility of the transformation in the real world, 667 
which hinges on a number of other factors, such as political and social concerns that might render 668 
feasible model solutions unattainable in the real world (Riahi et al., 2015). Infeasibility, in the case of 669 
SSP3, is thus rather an indication of increased risk that the required transformative changes may not be 670 
attainable due to technical or economic concerns. 671 
In all other SSPs (Figure 8), IAMs found the 2.6 W/m2 to be attainable, and it is possible that yet lower 672 
forcing levels might be attainable in some of these SSPs. As a matter of fact, some studies indicate that 673 
under certain conditions targets as low as 2.0 W/m2 might still be attainable during this century 674 
(Luderer et al., 2013; Rogelj et al., 2015; Rogelj et al., 2013a; Rogelj et al., 2013b). As a follow-up 675 
research activity to this special issue, the IAM teams are planning to use the SSP framework for a 676 
systematic exploration of the attainability of such low targets.  677 
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 678 
 679 
Figure 8: Carbon prices and the attainability of alternative forcing targets across the SSPs. The colors of the cells are 680 
indicative of the carbon price. The numbers in the boxes denote the carbon price of the marker scenarios with the full range 681 
of non-marker scenarios in parenthesis. White cells indicate the position of the respective baseline scenarios. Empty 682 
(crossed) cells could not be populated. Carbon prices are shown in terms of the net present value (NPV) of the average global 683 
carbon price from 2010 to 2100 using a discount rate of 5%. Mitigation costs for other metrics (GDP losses, consumption 684 
losses, and abatement costs) are provided as well in Section 1 of the Supplementary Material. Note that the SSP columns are 685 
ordered according to increasing mitigation challenges (low challenges (SSP1/SSP4), intermediate challenges (SSP2) and high 686 
mitigation challenges (SSP3/SSP5)). 687 
7. Discussion and conclusions 688 
We have shown how different SSP narratives can be translated into a set of assumptions for economic 689 
growth, population change, and urbanization, and how these projections can in turn be used by IAM 690 
models for the development of SSP baseline and mitigation scenarios. By doing so, this paper presented 691 
an overview of the main characteristics of five Shared Socioeconomic Pathways (SSPs) and related 692 
integrated assessment scenarios. These are provided to the community as one of the main building 693 
blocks of the “new scenario framework” (O’Neill et al, 2014, van Vuuren et al, 2014).  694 
This overview paper is complemented by additional articles in this special issue. Together the papers 695 
provide a detailed discussion of the different dimensions of the SSPs with the aim to offer the 696 
community a set of common assumptions for alternative socioeconomic development pathways. These 697 
pathways can be combined with different climate policy assumptions (SPAs) and climate change 698 
projections (e.g., the RCPs) and thus facilitate the integrated analyses of impacts, vulnerability, 699 
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adaptation and mitigation. The SSP scenarios presented here do not consider feedbacks due to climate 700 
change or associated impacts (with exception of the IMAGE scenarios which include the effect of 701 
fertilization on forest growth due to changing CO2 concentrations). This makes these scenarios 702 
particularly relevant for subsequent impact studies, since it facilitates the superposition of physical 703 
climate changes on top of the SSP scenarios to derive consistent estimates of impacts (or adaptation). 704 
The narratives, quantitative drivers, and IAM scenarios serve the purpose of providing the IAV, IAM and 705 
climate modeling community with information that enables them to use the scenario framework for a 706 
new generation of climate research. This special issue should be seen thus as a starting point for new 707 
climate change assessments through the lens of the SSPs and the new scenario framework. 708 
We find that while the SSPs and the associated scenarios were designed to represent different 709 
characteristics for the challenges to mitigation and adaptation, for many dimensions the resulting 710 
quantifications span a wide range broadly representative of the current literature. This is particularly the 711 
case for the SSP population and GDP projections as well as for the greenhouse gas emissions of the 712 
associated baseline scenarios. For some dimensions the SSPs go even beyond the historical ranges from 713 
the literature. This is specifically the case for urbanization where there has been little work in the past to 714 
explore the space of possibilities, and for air pollutant emissions. For the latter, the SSP scenarios span a 715 
considerably wider range compared to the RCPs, since the SSP scenarios explicitly consider alternative 716 
air pollution policy futures (in contrast to the RCPs, which were based on intermediate assumptions for 717 
air pollution legislation). 718 
Using multiple models for the development of the economic projections and the SSP scenarios was 719 
important in order to understand the robustness of the results and to be able to explore structural 720 
model uncertainties in comparison to uncertainties conditional on the interpretation of different SSP 721 
narratives. The development of the SSPs and their associated scenarios involved multiple rounds of 722 
public and internal reviews and the selection of marker SSP scenarios. While the markers can be 723 
interpreted as representative of a specific SSP development, they are not meant to provide a central or 724 
median interpretation. For each SSP alternative outcomes are possible, and the different IAMs are used 725 
to project conditional uncertainties that might be attributed to model structure and/or the 726 
interpretation/implementation of the qualitative storylines. Thus, in order to capture these 727 
uncertainties it is generally recommended to use as many realizations of each SSP as possible.  728 
By employing a systematic mitigation analysis across the SSPs, we have also conducted the first 729 
application of the scenario framework for the mitigation dimension. We find that mitigation costs 730 
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depend critically on the SSPs and the associated socioeconomic and policy assumptions. While our study 731 
could not reduce the large uncertainties associated with mitigation costs (Clarke et al., 2014), the SSP 732 
mitigation experiments have nonetheless helped to illustrate the role of various sources of uncertainty, 733 
including the extent to which mitigation costs may depend on different models or different 734 
interpretations of storylines. 735 
Another important finding from our assessment is that not all cells of the scenario matrix could be 736 
populated. On the high end, only SSP5 led to radiative forcing levels as high as RCP8.5, while at the low 737 
end  it was not possible to attain radiative forcing levels of 2.6 W/m2 in an SSP3 world. However, we 738 
cannot rule out the possibility that plausible combinations of assumptions could be identified that would 739 
enable the currently empty cells to be populated. For example, somewhat higher economic growth 740 
assumptions in a variant of SSP3 might lead to higher climate change (8.5 W/m2; Ren et al., 2015). Such 741 
an SSP3 variant would be relevant since it would combine high climate change with high vulnerability. 742 
Similarly, the results of the SSPs with low challenges to mitigation, particularly SSP1, indicate that it 743 
might be possible to reach yet lower radiative forcing levels than those included in the current matrix. 744 
Hence, efforts in the IAM community have started to apply the SSP framework for the development of 745 
deep mitigation scenarios that could extend the scenario matrix at the low end.  746 
The next steps of the community scenario process will comprise collaboration with the climate modeling 747 
teams of CMIP6 (Eyring et al., 2015) to assess the climate consequences of the SSPs. This work is 748 
organized as part of ScenarioMIP (O'Neill et al., 2016b). In addition, the modeling protocol that has been 749 
developed as part of this study (see Appendix A-C of the supplementary material) is made available to 750 
the IAM community in order to enable widespread participation of additional IAM modeling teams in 751 
quantifying the SSPs. Most importantly, the SSPs and associated scenarios aim to enable impacts, 752 
adaptation and vulnerability researchers to explore climate impacts and adaptation requirements under 753 
a range of different socio-economic developments and climate change projections. The plan is for an 754 
evolutionary expansion of the scenario framework matrix, so that a large body of literature based on 755 
comparable assumptions can emerge. Beyond the work on the global SSPs, important extensions are 756 
either planned or are under way (van Ruijven et al., 2014). These include extensions with respect to 757 
other sectors (e.g., www.isi-mip.org), specific regions (e.g., for the US (Absar and Preston, 2015) and for 758 
Europe (Alfieri et al., 2015)), or increased granularity and heterogeneity, for example, with respect to 759 
income distributions or spatially downscaled information on key socioeconomic drivers.  760 
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All results presented in this special issue are available on-line at the interactive SSP web-database 761 
hosted at IIASA: https://secure.iiasa.ac.at/web-apps/ene/SspDb/ 762 
 763 
References 764 
Absar, S.M., Preston, B.L. (2015) Extending the Shared Socioeconomic Pathways for sub-national 765 
impacts, adaptation, and vulnerability studies. Global Environmental Change 33, 83-96. 766 
Alfieri, L., Feyen, L., Dottori, F., Bianchi, A. (2015) Ensemble flood risk assessment in Europe under high 767 
end climate scenarios. Global Environmental Change 35, 199-212. 768 
Bauer, N., Katherine Calvin, Johannes Emmerling, Oliver Fricko, Shinichiro Fujimori, Jérôme Hilaire, 769 
Jiyong Eom , Volker Krey, Elmar Kriegler, Ioanna Mouratiadou, Harmen Sytze de Boer, Maarten van den 770 
Berg, Samuel Carrara, Laurent Drouet, Jae Edmonds, David Gernat, Mathijs Harmsen, Petr Havlik, Nils 771 
Johnson, Page Kyle, Gunnar Luderer, Giacomo Marangoni, Toshihiko Masui, Jessica Strefler, Manfred 772 
Strubegger, Marshall Wise, Keywan Riahi, Vuuren, D.P.v. (submitted) Shared Socio-Economic Pathways 773 
of the Energy Sector – Quantifying the Narratives. Global Environ. Change. 774 
Calvin, K., Ben Bond-Lamberty, Leon Clarke, James Edmonds, Jiyong Eom, Corinne Hartin, Sony Kim, 775 
Page Kyle, Robert Link, Richard Moss, Haewon McJeon, Pralit Patel, Steve Smith, Stephanie Waldhoff, 776 
Wise, M. (submitted) SSP4:  A World of Inequality. Global Environ. Change. 777 
Clarke, L., Edmonds, J., Krey, V., Richels, R., Rose, S., Tavoni, M. (2009) International climate policy 778 
architectures: Overview of the EMF 22 International Scenarios. Energy Economics 31, S64-S81. 779 
Clarke, L., Jiang, K., Akimoto, K., Babiker, M., Blanford, G., Fisher Vanden, K., Hourcade, J., Krey, V., 780 
Kriegler, E., Löschel, A., McCollum, D., Paltsev, S., Rose, S., R. Shukla, P., Tavoni, M., van der Zwaan, B., 781 
van Vuuren, D.P., (2014) Assessing Transformation Pathways, in: Edenhofer, O., Pichs-Madruga, R., 782 
Sokona, Y., Farahani, E., Kadner, S., Seyboth, K., Adler, A., Baum, I., Brunner, S., Eickemeier, P., 783 
Kriemann, B., Savolainen, J., Schlömer, S., von Stechow, C., Zwickel, T., Minx, J.C. (Eds.), Climate Change 784 
2014: Mitigation of Climate Change. Contribution of Working Group III to the Fifth Assessment Report of 785 
the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, United 786 
Kingdom. 787 
Crespo Cuaresma, J. (2016) Income projections for climate change research: A framework based on 788 
human capital dynamics. Global Environ. Change. 789 
Dellink, R., Chateau, J., Lanzi, E., Magné, B. (2016) Long-term economic growth projections in the Shared 790 
Socioeconomic Pathways. Global Environmental Change. 791 
Ebi, K.L., Hallegatte, S., Kram, T., Arnell, N.W., Carter, T.R., Edmonds, J., Kriegler, E., Mathur, R., O'Neill, 792 
B.C., Riahi, K., Winkler, H., van Vuuren, D.P., Zwickel, T. (2014) A new scenario framework for climate 793 
change research: Background, process, and future directions. Climatic Change 122, 363-372. 794 
Edenhofer, O., Knopf, B., Barker, T., Baumstark, L., Bellevrat, E., Chateau, B., Criqui, P., Isaac, M., Kitous, 795 
A., Kypreos, S., Leimbach, M., Lessmann, K., Magné, B., Scrieciu, Š., Turton, H., Van Vuuren, D.P. (2010) 796 
The economics of low stabilization: Model comparison of mitigation strategies and costs. Energy Journal 797 
31, 11-48. 798 
Eyring, V., Bony, S., Meehl, G.A., Senior, C., Stevens, B., Stouffer, R.J., Taylor, K.E. (2015) Overview of the 799 
Coupled Model Intercomparison Project Phase 6 (CMIP6) experimental design and organisation. Geosci. 800 
Model Dev. Discuss. 8, 10539-10583. 801 
Field, C.B., Barros, V.R., Mastrandrea, M.D., Mach, K.J., Abdrabo, M.-K., Adger, N., Anokhin, Y., Anisimov, 802 
O., Arent, D., Barnett, J. (2014) Summary for policymakers. Climate change 2014: impacts, adaptation, 803 
35 
 
and vulnerability. Part A: global and sectoral aspects. Contribution of Working Group II to the Fifth 804 
Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, 1-32. 805 
Fricko, O., Petr Havlik, Joeri Rogelj, Keywan Riahi, Zbigniew Klimont, Mykola Gusti, Nils Johnson, Peter 806 
Kolp, Manfred Strubegger, Hugo Valin, Markus Amann, Tatiana Ermolieva, Nicklas Forsell, Mario 807 
Herrero, Chris Heyes, Georg Kindermann, Volker Krey, David L. McCollum, Michael Obersteiner, Shonali 808 
Pachauri, Shilpa Rao, Erwin Schmid, Schoepp, W. (submitted) SSP2: a middle-of-the-road scenario for 809 
the 21st century. Global Environ. Change. 810 
Fujimori, S., Tomoko Hasegawa, Toshihiko Masui, Kiyoshi Takahashi, Diego Silva Herran, Hancheng Dai, 811 
Yasuaki Hijioka, Kainuma, M. (submitted) AIM Implementation of Shared Socioeconomic Pathways. 812 
Global Environ. Change. 813 
Grübler, A., O'Neill, B., Riahi, K., Chirkov, V., Goujon, A., Kolp, P., Prommer, I., Scherbov, S., Slentoe, E. 814 
(2007) Regional, national, and spatially explicit scenarios of demographic and economic change based 815 
on SRES. Technological Forecasting and Social Change 74, 980-1029. 816 
IPCC (2013) Summary for Policymakers. In: Climate Change 2013: The Physical Science Basis. 817 
Contribution of Working Group I to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on 818 
Climate Change. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, United Kingdom and New York, NY, USA. 819 
Jiang, L., O'Neill, B.C. (2016) Global urbanization projections for the Shared Socioeconomic Pathways. 820 
Global Environmental Change. 821 
KC, S., Lutz, W. (2016) The human core of the shared socioeconomic pathways: Population scenarios by 822 
age, sex and level of education for all countries to 2100. Global Environmental Change. 823 
Kriegler, E., Edmonds, J., Hallegatte, S., Ebi, K.L., Kram, T., Riahi, K., Winkler, H., van Vuuren, D.P. (2014a) 824 
A new scenario framework for climate change research: The concept of shared climate policy 825 
assumptions. Climatic Change 122, 401-414. 826 
Kriegler, E., Nico Bauer, Alexander Popp, Florian Humpenöder, Marian Leimbach, Jessica Strefler, Lavinia 827 
Baumstark, Benjamin Bodirsky, Jerome Hilaire, David Klein, Ioanna Mouratiadou, Isabelle Weindl, 828 
Christoph Bertram, Jan-Philipp Dietrich, Gunnar Luderer, Michaja Pehl, Robert Pietzcker, Franziska 829 
Piontek, Hermann Lotze-Campen, Anne Biewald, Markus Bonsch, Anastasis Giannousakis, Ulrich 830 
Kreidenweis, Christoph Müller, Susanne Rolinski, Jana Schwanitz, Stefanovic, M. (submitted) Fossil-831 
fueled development (SSP5): an energy and resource intensive scenario for the 21st century. Global 832 
Environ. Change. 833 
Kriegler, E., O'Neill, B.C., Hallegatte, S., Kram, T., Lempert, R.J., Moss, R.H., Wilbanks, T. (2012) The need 834 
for and use of socio-economic scenarios for climate change analysis: A new approach based on shared 835 
socio-economic pathways. Global Environmental Change 22, 807-822. 836 
Kriegler, E., Riahi, K., Bauer, N., Schwanitz, V.J., Petermann, N., Bosetti, V., Marcucci, A., Otto, S., 837 
Paroussos, L., Rao, S., Arroyo Currás, T., Ashina, S., Bollen, J., Eom, J., Hamdi-Cherif, M., Longden, T., 838 
Kitous, A., Méjean, A., Sano, F., Schaeffer, M., Wada, K., Capros, P., P. van Vuuren, D., Edenhofer, O. 839 
(2015) Making or breaking climate targets: The AMPERE study on staged accession scenarios for climate 840 
policy. Technological Forecasting and Social Change 90, 24-44. 841 
Kriegler, E., Weyant, J.P., Blanford, G.J., Krey, V., Clarke, L., Edmonds, J., Fawcett, A., Luderer, G., Riahi, 842 
K., Richels, R., Rose, S.K., Tavoni, M., van Vuuren, D.P. (2014b) The role of technology for achieving 843 
climate policy objectives: Overview of the EMF 27 study on global technology and climate policy 844 
strategies. Climatic Change 123, 353-367. 845 
Leimbach, M., Kriegler, E., Roming, N., Schwanitz, J. (2016) Future growth patterns of world regions - A 846 
GDP scenario approach. Global Environmental Change. 847 
Luderer, G., Pietzcker, R.C., Bertram, C., Kriegler, E., Meinshausen, M., Edenhofer, O. (2013) Economic 848 
mitigation challenges: How further delay closes the door for achieving climate targets. Environmental 849 
Research Letters 8. 850 
36 
 
Meinshausen, M., Raper, S.C.B., Wigley, T.M.L. (2011a) Emulating coupled atmosphere-ocean and 851 
carbon cycle models with a simpler model, MAGICC6 - Part 1: Model description and calibration. 852 
Atmospheric Chemistry and Physics 11, 1417-1456. 853 
Meinshausen, M., Wigley, T.M.L., Raper, S.C.B. (2011b) Emulating atmosphere-ocean and carbon cycle 854 
models with a simpler model, MAGICC6 - Part 2: Applications. Atmospheric Chemistry and Physics 11, 855 
1457-1471. 856 
Morita, T., Nakićenović, N.j., Robinson, J. (2000) Overview of mitigation scenarios for global climate 857 
stabilization based on new IPCC emission scenarios (SRES). Environmental Economics and Policy Studies 858 
3, 65-88. 859 
Moss, R.H., Edmonds, J.A., Hibbard, K.A., Manning, M.R., Rose, S.K., Van Vuuren, D.P., Carter, T.R., 860 
Emori, S., Kainuma, M., Kram, T., Meehl, G.A., Mitchell, J.F.B., Nakicenovic, N., Riahi, K., Smith, S.J., 861 
Stouffer, R.J., Thomson, A.M., Weyant, J.P., Wilbanks, T.J. (2010) The next generation of scenarios for 862 
climate change research and assessment. Nature 463, 747-756. 863 
Nakicenovic, N., Swart, R., (2000) Special Report on Emissions Scenarios (SRES). Cambridge University 864 
Press, Cambridge, UK. 865 
Nelson, G.C., Valin, H., Sands, R.D., Havlík, P., Ahammad, H., Deryng, D., Elliott, J., Fujimori, S., Hasegawa, 866 
T., Heyhoe, E., Kyle, P., Von Lampe, M., Lotze-Campen, H., Mason D'Croz, D., Van Meijl, H., Van Der 867 
Mensbrugghe, D., Müller, C., Popp, A., Robertson, R., Robinson, S., Schmid, E., Schmitz, C., Tabeau, A., 868 
Willenbockel, D. (2014) Climate change effects on agriculture: Economic responses to biophysical 869 
shocks. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America 111, 3274-870 
3279. 871 
O'Neill, B.C., Kriegler, E., Ebi, K.L., Kemp-Benedict, E., Riahi, K., Rothman, D.S., van Ruijven, B.J., van 872 
Vuuren, D.P., Birkmann, J., Kok, K., Levy, M., Solecki, W. (2016a) The roads ahead: Narratives for shared 873 
socioeconomic pathways describing world futures in the 21st century. Global Environmental Change 874 
Accepted. 875 
O'Neill, B.C., Kriegler, E., Riahi, K., Ebi, K.L., Hallegatte, S., Carter, T.R., Mathur, R., van Vuuren, D.P. 876 
(2014) A new scenario framework for climate change research: The concept of shared socioeconomic 877 
pathways. Climatic Change 122, 387-400. 878 
O'Neill, B.C., Tebaldi, C., van Vuuren, D., Eyring, V., Friedlingstein, P., Hurtt, G., Knutti, R., Kriegler, E., 879 
Lamarque, J.-F., Lowe, J., Meehl, J., Moss, R., Riahi, K., Sanderson, B.M. (2016b) The Scenario Model 880 
Intercomparison Project (ScenarioMIP) for CMIP6. Geosci. Model Dev. Discuss. in review. 881 
Popp, A., Katherine Calvin, Shinichiro Fujimori, Petr Havlik, Florian Humpenöder, Elke Stehfest, Benjamin 882 
Bodirsky, Jan Philipp Dietrich, Jonathan Doelmann, Mykola Gusti, Tomoko Hasegawa, Page Kyle, Michael 883 
Obersteiner, Andrzej Tabeau, Kiyoshi Takahashi, Hugo Valin, Stephanie Waldhoff, Isabelle Weindl, 884 
Marshall Wise, Elmar Kriegler, Hermann Lotze-Campen, Oliver Fricko, Keywan Riahi, Vuuren, D.v. 885 
(submitted) Land use futures in the Shared Socio-Economic Pathways. Global Environ. Change. 886 
Popp, A., Rose, S.K., Calvin, K., Van Vuuren, D.P., Dietrich, J.P., Wise, M., Stehfest, E., Humpenöder, F., 887 
Kyle, P., Van Vliet, J., Bauer, N., Lotze-Campen, H., Klein, D., Kriegler, E. (2014) Land-use transition for 888 
bioenergy and climate stabilization: Model comparison of drivers, impacts and interactions with other 889 
land use based mitigation options. Climatic Change 123, 495-509. 890 
Rao, S., Zbigniew Klimont, Steven J Smith, Rita Van Dingenen, Frank Dentener, Lex Bouwman, Benjamin 891 
Bodirsky, Katherine Calvin, Laurent Drouet, Oliver Fricko, Shinichiro Fujimori, Gunnar Luderer, David 892 
Gernaat, Petr Havlik, Mathijs Harmsen, Tomoko Hasegawa, Chris Heyes, Jérôme Hilaire, Toshihiko 893 
Masui, Lara Aleluia Reis, Elke Stehfest, Jessica Strefler, Sietske van der Sluis, Tavoni, M., Riahi, K., Vuren, 894 
D.v. (submitted) Future Air Pollution in the Shared Socio-Economic Pathways. 895 
Ren, X., Weitzel M, O'Neill B, Lawrence P, Meiyappan P, Levis S, Balistreri EJ, M, D., (2015) Avoided 896 
economic impacts of climate change on agriculture: Integrating a land surface model (CLM) with a global 897 
economic model (iPETS), Working Paper. Colorado School of Mines, Division of Economics and Business. 898 
37 
 
Riahi, K., Kriegler, E., Johnson, N., Bertram, C., den Elzen, M., Eom, J., Schaeffer, M., Edmonds, J., Isaac, 899 
M., Krey, V., Longden, T., Luderer, G., Méjean, A., McCollum, D.L., Mima, S., Turton, H., van Vuuren, D.P., 900 
Wada, K., Bosetti, V., Capros, P., Criqui, P., Hamdi-Cherif, M., Kainuma, M., Edenhofer, O. (2015) Locked 901 
into Copenhagen pledges - Implications of short-term emission targets for the cost and feasibility of 902 
long-term climate goals. Technological Forecasting and Social Change 90, 8-23. 903 
Rogelj, J., Luderer, G., Pietzcker, R.C., Kriegler, E., Schaeffer, M., Krey, V., Riahi, K. (2015) Energy system 904 
transformations for limiting end-of-century warming to below 1.5 °C. Nature Climate Change 5, 519-527. 905 
Rogelj, J., McCollum, D.L., O'Neill, B.C., Riahi, K. (2013a) 2020 emissions levels required to limit warming 906 
to below 2°C. Nature Climate Change 3, 405-412. 907 
Rogelj, J., McCollum, D.L., Reisinger, A., Meinshausen, M., Riahi, K. (2013b) Probabilistic cost estimates 908 
for climate change mitigation. Nature 493, 79-83. 909 
Schmitz, C., van Meijl, H., Kyle, P., Nelson, G.C., Fujimori, S., Gurgel, A., Havlik, P., Heyhoe, E., d'Croz, 910 
D.M., Popp, A., Sands, R., Tabeau, A., van der Mensbrugghe, D., von Lampe, M., Wise, M., Blanc, E., 911 
Hasegawa, T., Kavallari, A., Valin, H. (2014) Land-use change trajectories up to 2050: Insights from a 912 
global agro-economic model comparison. Agricultural Economics (United Kingdom) 45, 69-84. 913 
Smith, P., Gregory, P.J., Van Vuuren, D., Obersteiner, M., Havlík, P., Rounsevell, M., Woods, J., Stehfest, 914 
E., Bellarby, J. (2010) Competition for land. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological 915 
Sciences 365, 2941-2957. 916 
Tavoni, M., Kriegler, E., Riahi, K., Van Vuuren, D.P., Aboumahboub, T., Bowen, A., Calvin, K., Campiglio, 917 
E., Kober, T., Jewell, J., Luderer, G., Marangoni, G., McCollum, D., Van Sluisveld, M., Zimmer, A., Van Der 918 
Zwaan, B. (2015) Post-2020 climate agreements in the major economies assessed in the light of global 919 
models. Nature Climate Change 5, 119-126. 920 
Taylor, K.E., Stouffer, R.J., Meehl, G.A. (2012) An overview of CMIP5 and the experiment design. Bulletin 921 
of the American Meteorological Society 93, 485-498. 922 
UN (2014) United Nations, World Urbanization Prospects: The 2014 Revision. United Nations 923 
Publication, New York  924 
UNFCCC (2015) INDCs as communicated by Parties. 925 
van Ruijven, B., Levy, M., Agrawal, A., Biermann, F., Birkmann, J., Carter, T., Ebi, K., Garschagen, M., 926 
Jones, B., Jones, R., Kemp-Benedict, E., Kok, M., Kok, K., Lemos, M., Lucas, P., Orlove, B., Pachauri, S., 927 
Parris, T., Patwardhan, A., Petersen, A., Preston, B., Ribot, J., Rothman, D., Schweizer, V. (2014) 928 
Enhancing the relevance of Shared Socioeconomic Pathways for climate change impacts, adaptation and 929 
vulnerability research. Climatic Change 122, 481-494. 930 
van Vuuren, D.P., Carter, T.R. (2014) Climate and socio-economic scenarios for climate change research 931 
and assessment: Reconciling the new with the ol. Climatic Change 122, 415-429. 932 
van Vuuren, D.P., Edmonds, J., Kainuma, M., Riahi, K., Thomson, A., Hibbard, K., Hurtt, G.C., Kram, T., 933 
Krey, V., Lamarque, J.F., Masui, T., Meinshausen, M., Nakicenovic, N., Smith, S.J., Rose, S.K. (2011) The 934 
representative concentration pathways: An overview. Climatic Change 109, 5-31. 935 
van Vuuren, D.P., Elke Stehfest, David Gernaat, Jonathan Doelman, Maarten van Berg, Mathijs Harmsen, 936 
H.-S.d.B., Lex Bouwman, Vassilis Daioglou, Oreane Edelenbosch, Bastien Girod, Tom Kram, Luis 937 
Lassaletta, Paul Lucas, Hans van Meijl, Christoph Müller, Bas van Ruijven, Andrzej Tabeau (submitted) 938 
Energy, land-use and greenhouse gas emissions trajectories under a green growth paradigm. . Global 939 
Environ. Change,. 940 
van Vuuren, D.P., Kriegler, E., O'Neill, B.C., Ebi, K.L., Riahi, K., Carter, T.R., Edmonds, J., Hallegatte, S., 941 
Kram, T., Mathur, R., Winkler, H. (2014) A new scenario framework for Climate Change Research: 942 
Scenario matrix architecture. Climatic Change 122, 373-386. 943 
Van Vuuren, D.P., Riahi, K., Moss, R., Edmonds, J., Thomson, A., Nakicenovic, N., Kram, T., Berkhout, F., 944 
Swart, R., Janetos, A., Rose, S.K., Arnell, N. (2012) A proposal for a new scenario framework to support 945 
38 
 
research and assessment in different climate research communities. Global Environmental Change 22, 946 
21-35. 947 
Victor, D.G., Kennel, C.F. (2014) Climate policy: Ditch the 2°C warming goal. Nature 514, 30-31. 948 
Von Lampe, M., Willenbockel, D., Ahammad, H., Blanc, E., Cai, Y., Calvin, K., Fujimori, S., Hasegawa, T., 949 
Havlik, P., Heyhoe, E., Kyle, P., Lotze-Campen, H., Mason d'Croz, D., Nelson, G.C., Sands, R.D., Schmitz, 950 
C., Tabeau, A., Valin, H., van der Mensbrugghe, D., van Meijl, H. (2014) Why do global long-term 951 
scenarios for agriculture differ? An overview of the AgMIP global economic model intercomparison. 952 
Agricultural Economics (United Kingdom) 45, 3-20. 953 
 954 
 955 
